Toward a Neo-Whig “Activist” Court (Part III or III)
Part I can be found here. Part II can be found here.
Conclusion: A New Glorious Judicial Revolution
Because conservatism is ill-equipped to correct the problems the United States faces as a result of nonoriginalist, activist Supreme Court decisions, there needs to be a countering force that will return the country to its traditional foundation. The failure of conservatism means that this countering force must itself be “activist” in the sense that the doctrine of stare decisis cannot be an impediment to restoring tradition. However, I contend that, properly understood, it is not “activist” at all. A judiciary operating in the Neo-Whig fashion would be restoring to the Constitution, its lost unwritten half, returning it to the previous understanding that the document traditionally has enjoyed. For the written Constitution, this will mean the return to the “historical experiences, conventions, customs, the complexities of political compromise, and long-received principles of morality” that Americans have known for nearly 220 years. For the unwritten constitution it will mean a return to those values known to the Anglo-American tradition for nearly 800 years. Once again Professor Calabresi provides an excellent example of Neo-Whig reasoning:
For example, in Apprendi, Blakely, and United States v. Booker, the U.S. Supreme recently revived the notion that mandatory sentencing guidelines could not give judges the power to adjust upward a prisoner’s sentence unless the charges justifying the upward adjustment were proved to a jury. Under Professor Merrill’s conventionalism, these cases are certainly wrongly decided because for about 20 years, since the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, we have gotten quite used to a reduced role for the jury in finding all the critical facts leading to a sentence. For Merrill, I assume, the fact that thousands of cases have been decided this way for twenty years means the Court’s Apprendi line of cases is clearly a violation of conventionalism.
I think, of course, that the Court in the Apprendi line of cases rejected twenty years of wayward practice and restored an 800 year old fundamental right to jury trial under English and American law. Was this “revolutionary” decision consistent with a general skepticism about the powers of human reason? You bet it was. The innovation of the last twenty years in cutting back on the right to jury trials was the effort of the Sentencing Commission to give us a more rational world, and it was that effort which smacked of the French Revolution. In rejecting, the practice of the last 20 years and restoring the practice of the previous 800 years, the Apprendi Court was leading a conservative revolution, a coming full circle if you will and returning to the point where we started.[1]
Returning to the “right to privacy” example and illustrating how a Neo-Whig Court would approach a case in that line is profitable. If we suppose, as is likely to happen in the near future,[2] that one of the states passed a prohibition on abortion and that a challenge to that law was heard by the Supreme Court, how would a Neo-Whig’s approach look? First, the Neo-Whig would look to the text of the Constitution (anew) to see if a right to abortion or some other right (like a right to reproductive privacy) could be found there. As noted above, Justice Stewart was unable to find any wording in the Constitution that could be read to make the right to privacy into an enforceable right let alone would anyone have been able to find a right to abortion, which is an extension of the right to privacy. The presumption, at this point, would be against there being such a right.
However, the Ninth Amendment says that “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”[3] Since a Neo-Whig believes in the existence of an unwritten constitution, there must be a mechanism for reading it into the written constitution. There are a few places where this might be done. The first is the Ninth Amendment. Unenumerated rights are just the sort of thing one might expect to find in an unwritten constitution, therefore it is only natural that one would use the Ninth Amendment to import them since they have been neither denied or disparaged. The second place where one might be able to import some of the content of the unwritten constitution might be the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[4]
Therefore, the Neo-Whig would have to look to the “historical experiences, conventions, customs, the complexities of political compromise, and long-received principles of morality”[5] to see if such a right has been historically enjoyed by Americans. Upon such an examination, the Neo-Whig would discover that there is no such long-standing custom or principle of morality that supports the right to abortion.[6] A Neo-Whig may very well conclude that there is an historical acknowledgement of some sort of right to privacy, but it would almost certainly not extend to sexual behavior that has historically been considered immoral through the centuries.[7] Therefore, a Neo-Whig would conclude that since there is no text supporting the proposed right to abortion, and since abortion is not a right that finds long-standing expression in the historical experiences of Americans, that the Federal Constitution has nothing to say on the matter. This outcome would incidentally support the long-standing American values of limited government, the writtenness of the Constitution and Federalism by the simple fact that the decision of whether or not an abortion would be legal, limited or illegal would be left to the states.
Similarly, each of the other cases mentioned above[8] would be approached in the same way. Contraceptive use and homosexual sodomy would likely be found to be issues for the several states to decide and not an occasion for federal intervention.
But how does this differ from the originalist approach? Let us take Justice Scalia as an example. In Troxel v. Granville, Scalia wrote “the Constitution’s refusal to ‘deny or disparage’ other rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even farther removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the people.”[9] Likewise, Judge Bork has likened the Ninth Amendment to an indecipherable “inkblot.”[10] However, with nearly 800 years of evidence to draw from, the content of those unenumerated rights is really not so hard to discern for a Neo-Whig. There is no harm in protecting the traditional rights of Englishmen, passed down through the Constitution to Americans. Rather, the harm would be in disparaging those rights that the founding generation risked so much to defend.
A Neo-Whig revolution in the judiciary, where Traditionalists (formerly conservatives) take back the reins of the Courts is America’s only hope for a return to the values, customs and morals that made this country the greatest to grace the earth. No longer can the country afford to have innovation upon innovation ratcheted in place by a conservative judiciary lacking the tools to turn the tide. It is time to take over the laying of the track, to make a 180 degree turn, and, if the conservatives still desire, they can pound in the spikes behind the Neo-Whigs.
[1] Id. at 49-50.
[2] The South Dakota legislature recently passed legislation that severely limited the availability of abortions in the state, making nearly every abortion illegal. It looked headed for a constitutional challenge when opponents of the law managed to garner enough signatures to have the law placed on the ballot last November for a public referendum vote. It lost on the ballot initiative. However, it is not unlikely that some other state (or perhaps South Dakota) will try again and find a public willing to let the measure go to the Supreme Court. See South Dakota abortion ban rejected, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2006/SD/2006-11-08-abortion-ban_x.htm, last accessed Dec. 6, 2006.
[3] U.S. Const. amend. IX.
[4] U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
[5] Kirk, supra note 57, at 57-8.
[6] Roe, 410 U.S. at 174-7, n.1-2. (Rehnquist dissenting).
[7] Id.
[8] Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, Casey, and Lawrence.
[9] Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000).
[10] REVIEW & OUTLOOK (Editorial): The Bork Disinformers, WALL ST. J., Oct 5, 1987.



